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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

]
])

ROBERT M. McRAE,
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 900503 CA

,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court
U.C.A.

has

jurisdiction

to hear

this

Section 78-2a-3(d) which established

case pursuant

to

jurisdiction to hear

appeals from the Circuit Courts.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1,

May the State appeal

this case or is it barred by the

provisions of U.C.A. Section 77-18a-l(2)?
2.

Can

a

negative

inference

from

Defendant's

refusal

to

take field sobriety tests be used to establish probable cause to
arrest a Defendant for D.U.I.?
3.

Was

there

probable

cause

to

arrest

Defendant

for

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol?
As Appellant

is not challenging any of the Findings of Fact

of the Trial Court

(except as noted

but

the

is questioning

legal

in the body of this brief),

conclusions

based

on

those

facts,

the standard of review is that dealing with questions of law and
no particular deference is given to the Trial Court.
Page
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC,
U.C.A, SECTION 77-lSa-l(2)
(2)

An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from.(a)

A final judgment of dismissal;

(b)

an order arresting judgment;

(c)

an order terminating the prosecution because

of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy
trial;
(d)

a judgment of the court holding a statute or

any part of it invalid;
(e)

an order of the court granting a pretrial

motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for
review

the appellate

court decides

that the appeal

would be in the interest of justice; or
(f)

an order of the court granting a motion to

withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal case in which Defendant

was charged with possessing an open container of alcohol in his
vehicle.
DUI ,

Defendant was although he was arrested for suspicion of

A procedural

inventory

yielded an open container.

search subsequent to the arrest

The DUI charges were dropped when the

results of a blood test were obtained,
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The case was originally
Page

filed
2

in Justice Court, but was

transferred to Circuit Court prior to trial.

Defendant made a

Motion to Suppress, but no ruling was sought prior to the time
set

for trial.

Defendant renewed his motion at trial and the

Court, in a bench trial, combined the hearing on the motion to
suppress with the trial, after ascertaining that the State was
"sufficiently informed" to go forward in the matter.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
At

the

conclusion

of

the evidence, the Court

granted

Defendant's Motion to Suppress and dismissed the case and issued
a "Ruling on Motion to Suppress and Order of Dismissal" in which
he found the Defendant not guilty.
D.

FACTS
1.

Defendant McRae was arrested on Friday, May 12, 1989,

and was subsequently charged with having an opened container in
his vehicle.
2.

(Trial Transcript, pp. 11-12, p. 33, lines 2-7.)

Defendant McRae personally

filed a Motion to Dismiss

"on the grounds that there was no probable cause on which the
search of Defendant's vehicle was predicated."

I See

Motion to

Dismiss.)
3.

Defendant did not submit a Memorandum, cite any facts,

request a hearing, or request a ruling on his Motion to Dismiss.
(See file.)
4.
Motion

Defendant, through counsel Harry Souvall, renewed his
to Dismiss at trial

"based

on his claim that the law

enforcement officer had no probable cause to arrest Defendant, or
to search his vehicle"

(Paragraph 3 of Court's Ruling and Trial
Page
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Transcript, p. 5, lines 10-12.)
5.

Judge Payne, at a bench trial, combined the hearing on

Defendant's Motion

to Dismiss with

(Paragraph 4 of Court's Ruling).
the

consent

of

representation

Defendant's motion.
6.

This was done? not so much on

the State, as
that

it was

the trial on the merits,

it was based
"sufficiently

on the

State's

informed"

as

to

(Transcript, page 8, lines 10-17.)

The Trial Court found that "its obvious Mr. McRae's had

an open container in his vehicle."

(Transcript, page 72, lines

19-20).
7.

The Trial

Defendant

Court

and dismissed

found

no probable

the case.

cause to arrest

(See Transcript, page 79,

lines 8-10) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I .
In
this

I S THIS APPEAL BARRED BY U . C . A .
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
State

Court

v.

Willard,

held

that

resolution

in

elements

of

the

labeled

a

pursuant

to

P.

that

offense

a

U.C.A.
and

trial

without

so

even

though

application

of

"ruling
the

that

is

an

46

on

one

acquittal",

Section

77-18a-l(2)

[Previously

violating
the

the

double

acquittal
law

or

an

Page

State

77-35-26(3)(a)]
may n o t

resulted
improper

4

more
if

Utah

The

it

is

appeal
Crim

Court

also

be

an

the

R.

subjected

clause.

from

of

cannot

again

jeopardy

factual

even

the

once a c q u i t t e d

a

or

therefore,

Section

(11-14-90),

constitutes

Defendant

charged

U.C.A.

the

Rep 45 a t

and

"Defendant

to

a
of

dismissal,

26(3)(a)

held

favor

147 U t a h A d v .

SECTION 7 7 - 1 8 A - 1 AND

This

is

incorrect

determination

of

the

facts,"

(citations omitted.)

on a ruling
hearing

on a Motion

was held

and

The appeal in Willard also focused

to Suppress, but, unlike

a determination

made prior

this case, a
to trial.

At

trial when the Motion was renewed, the Judge changed his ruling
and

suppressed

Musselman,

the

667

evidence.

P. 2d

1061,

The

(Utah,

Court
1983),

also cited

State

v.

as authority

for

its

decision in Willard.
In this case, Defendant sought neither a hearing nor ruling
on

his Motion

renew

that

to Dismiss

motion

at

prior

trial.

to
The

the

trial

State would

However, he did
assert

that

the

Defendant in this case, as in Musselman, is seeking to manipulate
motion practice so as to avoid having to face a valid charge.
In State v. Musselman, 667 P 2d 1061 fUtah, 1983\, the Court
stated
"Indeed, d e f e n d a n t ' s motion to dismiss could, and
undoubtedly should, have been made before the trial
commenced, although the court had the power to consider
the contention at any time.
Section 77-35-12/c^ 'Rule
12fc) , Utah R . C r i m . P . ) .
But the delay neither
prohibited the defendant from making the motion, nor
the State from treating it as a motion to dismiss for
purposes of appealability under Section 77-35-26(cK
Nor can d e f e n d a n t ' s d e l a y , as such, determine the
double jeopardy issue.
To allow a defendant to make a
motion to d i s m i s s solely on legal grounds after the
trial commenced, instead of prior to trial, and then
claim double jeopardy if the motion is successful in
the trial court but reversed on appeal, would permit a
defendant to manipulate motion practice so as to avoid
having to face a valid charge. The basic interest that
the public has in having its laws enforced may not be

A l s o s e e D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n with regard to
Discovery
Transcript, page 4, lines 6-25, and page 7, lines 31 5 , where Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss for failure to
provide discovery in accordance with Rule 16, even though the
request had been made by telephone the day before the trial.

so easily circumvented.
The

State

only

at 1066.

represented

that

it

was

familiar

with

Defendant's motion and was prepared to proceed with a hearing on
the motion.

It did not consent to waive any appeal it might have

as a result of the Trial Court's ruling on the motion.
The

State

would

obtain

a hearing

cannot

avoid

an

assert

and

that

ruling

appeal

of

it was

Defendant's

on his motion

the

issues

prior

raised

by

burden

to

trial

the motion

to
and
by

waiting until the trial to obtain a ruling on his motion.
The Judge's oral findings from the bench made it clear that
Defendant

would

be

guilty

Motion to Suppress,

but

for

the

ruling

on

Defendant's

This is not a case where the Defendant

was

found not guilty based on the facts, but was a dismissal based on
"technicality"If Defendant

had

obtained

a ruling

on his motion prior

to

trial, the State would be submitting a petition for review under
U,C.A.

Section

charges.

77-18a-l(e).

But, the Trial Judge dismissed

Therefore, the State is appealing a final

the

judgment of

dismissal pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-18a-l.
The
less)

dismissal

after

the

of

the

Trial

charges

Court

ruled

came
on

five seconds
Defendant's

(more

or

Motion

to

Suppress.

The State has made no effort to skirt the restrictions

of

Section

722

U.C.A.
P. 2d

Appellate
failing

747
Court
to

77-18a-l

(Utah,
not

obtain

1986).

allow
a

governing
The

the

ruling
Page

appeals.

State would

Defendant

or hearing
6

State v.
request

to avoid

that

appeal

on his motion

Gomez,

by

prior

the
his
to

trial.
would

Had Defendant's
have

Defendant

had

the

should

motion been

opportunity

not

be

able

unsuccessful, he

to

appeal.

to manipulate

As

certainly

in Musselman,

the timing of

his

motion so as to preclude the State from appealing if his motion
is successful, all while preserving

his

right to appeal

if his

motion is unsuccessful.
POINT

II.

MAY A NEGATIVE INFERENCE BE DRAWN
TAKE A FIELD SOBRIETY TEST?

Trooper
sobriety
arrest

Gustin

cited

tests as one
McRae.

In

McRae's

refusal

factor he relied

Paragraph

19(e),

upon
the

FROM A REFUSAL

to

take

the

cited

"The fact t h a t the D e f e n d a n t , who is a licensed
a t t o r n e y , refused to take a field sobriety test.
(Trooper Gustin apparently believed that, because the
Defendant was familiar with the purpose of a field
sobriety test, his refusal to take the tests was an
implied admission that he had consumed sufficient
alcohol so that he could not pass the tests.)"
The Court then found in Paragraph 20 that:
" B a s e d u p o n t h e a b o v e , the Court finds that the
Defendant had a right not to take the field sobriety
t e s t s and the e x e r c i s e of t h a t r i g h t cannot be
construed as evidence of intoxication."
At Trial, Judge Payne made the following statement:
"The refusal to take a field sobriety test, I think is,
when we're dealing with Mr. McRae, who is an attorney,
well within his rights.
I don't think that I can take
that as an indication that he's intoxicated, if it is
within his rights not to cooperate with the State in
gathering evidence which may be used against him, even
if he were under the influence of alcohol, and even if
this were a case involving a DUI case, he is not under
any obligation to do those type of things, and I don't
think that I am at liberty to assume that because he
chose not to participate in t h a t , that that is an
indication that he was intoxicated, and I'm not going
7

to

Gustin's

factor as follows:

Page

field

in his decision

Court

TO

to do that."

Transcript, p. 74, lines 12-23.

It seems clear that the Court ruled that the refusal to take
the field sobriety tests could not be used to establish probable
cause as Defendant had a right not to take the tests.
In State v. Erickson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep.45 (11-27-1990), the
Court held that field sobriety tests do not come within the selfincrimination
Constitutions.

provision

of

the

United

States

and

Utah

The Court cited Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2

at 1173 and held that "the overwhelming weight of authority holds
that,

although

perform

a

roadside

suspect
or

or

field

accused

sobriety

cannot

be

testy,

such

'compelled 1
tests

violate an accused's privilege against self-incrimination
they are non-testimonial
Defendant's
from

in nature."

constitutional

a refusal

to perform

tests

not

because

As the tests do not violate

rights, drawing

the

do

to

cannot

an adverse
violate

opinion

Defendant's

constitutional ri ghts.
Often,

evidence

is used

to

establish

probable

cause

that

could not be used at trial, i,e., anonymous reliable informants,
heresay evidence, etc.

This evidence could not be used at

without violating wej] established
Defendant's right to confront
POINT III.
In

constitutional

trial

rights such as

his accusers.

WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT?

State v. Dronebury, 120 Utah Adv. Rep 28 f 10-20-891 f the

Court stated:
"Because a trial court is in an advantageous position
to assess witness credibility, 'we will not disturb its
factual assessment underlying a decision to .., deny a
suppression motion unless it clearly appears that th<=>
Page
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lower court was in error.1
State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Schlosser,
774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Griffin, 754
P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The State is troubled by two (2) of the Court's conclusions
in this case, one made at trial in the Court ! s Oral Findings, and
one in the written decision with regard to probable cause, both
of which may involve factual finding and therefore, the standard
of review would be that stated above in Dronebury.
Probable

cause

to

arrest

means

that

the officer

has

reasonable grounds or is aware of circumstances which would lead
a

reasonably

Defendant.

prudent

man

to

believe

in the guilt

of

the

it is not the equivalent to the knowledge and belief

necessary to find a man guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or even
that guilt is more probable than not, but it is more than a bare
suspicion.

It is less than is required to find probable cause at

a preliminary

hearing, but more than the reasonable suspicion

required for an investigatory stop.
P.2d 778 (Utah, 19

).

See State v. Anderson, 612

At each successive stage, the burden on

the State and the necessity prove the certainty of guilt grows.
Inevitably, peace officers are faced with a decision to arrest
based on

incomplete

information.

It is necessary

that

the

information that the officer has at the time of arrest lead him
to reasonably conclude that guilt is more than a possibility.
In this case, the Court stated:
"We have the admission that he drank two cans of beer,
which is an indication that he had consumed alcohol,
but certainly not an indication that he had consumed
sufficient alcohol to be intoxicated with respect to
Page
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the DUI."
This

statement

that person

seems

to

indicate

that

the Court

believes

(in particular, the Defendant) cannot be intoxicated

after consuming two beers.

This conclusion is clearly erroneous.

Such a determination would have to be determined based on various
factors,
beers
No

including

were

such

Defendant's

consumed

Defendant's

time

over which

the

the particular

Defendant's

metabolism.

was

introduced

at

trial,

except

approximate

size, none

of

evidence

and

size, the

officers at the time of arrest.

and

it was available

for

to

the

The State would assert that this

finding is clearly erroneous, and constitutes the basic flaw with
the Trial Court's determination that there was no probable cause
to arrest McRae on a DUI charge.
The other
Officer

troubling

Robert's

Paragraph

23

conclusion

that

area

testimony

of

the

is the Trial
to

Court's

Robert's

establish
Ruling),

testimony

Court's

reliance

probable
despite

"was not

cause
the

on

(see

Court's

complete" and

was

"not extensive with respect to intoxication" and that "(i)n this
matter, the prosecution did not appear to rely at all upon Deputy
Roberts on the issue of intoxication.
that

Roberts

was

called

and

Tt appeared

testified

to

to the Court

establish

that

the

Defendant had operated the motor vehicle."

The court also found

in

trial;,

Paragraph

24

that

"As

indicated

at

absent

the

testimony of Deputy Roberts, this Court may have been inclined to
rely

upon

conclusion

Trooper
that

Gustin's
the

obvious

Defendant

Page
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was

integrity

in coming

intoxicated.

The

to

the

state

believes that these findings are inconsistent.
The State believes that there was probable cause to arrest
McRae for DUI.

Both officers observed the strong odor of alcohol

and McRae admitted to both officers that he had consumed two (2)
beers.

McRae, an attorney, refused to perform field sobriety

tests.

These facts alone establish probable cause, without the

numerous additional

facts cited

by Trooper Gustin.

Clearly,

Trooper Gustin had reason to believe that McRae was DUI and that
this belief was more than a mere suspicion or possibility.
CONCLUSION
The State believes this appeal should be considered because
the Trial Court's ruling was based solely on the outcome of the
Motion to Suppress.

The State also believes that there was

probable cause to arrest McRae based on the facts known to the
officers at the time and that the Trial Court erred, specifically
in that (a) it did not consider McRae's refusal to take the field
sobriety tests as establishing probable cause, (b) it concluded
that two (2) beers was insufficient to render McRae intoxicated,
and (c) it based its conclusion on Robert's incomplete testimony,
which was "not extensive with respect to intoxication".
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1991.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:

Page 11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the 8th day of February, 1991, I
m a i l e d a t r u e a n d correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to Harry H. Souvall, McRAE & DeLAND,
Attorney for Defendant, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah
84078,
by depositing the same in the United States Post Office at
Roosevelt, Utah.

Attorney
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

ROBERT M. MCRAE,

:
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

CASE NO.

:

This matter came on for Trial on March 22, 1990. Herbert Wm.
Gillespie appeared on behalf of the State. Harry H. Souvall
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant was not
present and through his attorney, waived his right to be present.
Judge Payne indicated that he was personally acquainted with
the Defendant in this matter and offerred to recuse himself. Both
parties, through there respective attorneys, requested that Judge
Payne hear the case.
Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss the case on the basis that
the State had not provided material requested in the discovery
process. The Court determined that the Discovery Request had not
been made until March 21, 1990, and denied the Motion.
Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss which was filed on
June 27, 1989 based upon his claim that the law enforcement
officer had no probable cause to stop Defendant, to arrest
Defendant, or to search his vehicle.
The Court determined that there had not been a Ruling on
Defendant's Motion in the Justice Court, that the case had been
transferred from the Justice Court to the Circuit Court without
Trial, and that this was not an Appeal from a determination on the
merits by the Justice Court. The parties stipulated that this
matter would be treated as though it had been originally filed in
the Circuit Court. At the request of the parties, the Court
combined the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the
Trial on the merits and proceeded with the Tri~&* +*rH^F££J. upon the
evidence presented at trial, the Court finds as follows:

1. That Defendant was stopped at a highway road block
pursuant to a planned operation which had been reduced to written
form prior to being implemented. Defendant was stopped in
accordance with the plan. There was no violation of the
Defendant's rights with respect to being stopped at the road block
and the Court finds that a reasonable suspicion existed which
justified a brief investigatory detention after the initial stop.
The Defendant was recognized by all law enforcement officers who
dealt with him as being a prominent criminal defense attorney in
this area.
2. There was no evidence as to unusual or unsafe driving.
The evidence indicated that the Defendant stopped his vehicle in
compliance with the procedures in effect for the road block.
After stopping his vehicle, the Defendant pulled his vehicle to
the side of the road as instructed. The evidence indicates that
the Defendant responded appropriately as he approached the road
block, that he slowed and stopped at the road block as was
indicated by the police officers, and that he pulled his vehicle
to the side of the road in accordance with the request of the
officers.
3. Deputy Roberts of the Duchesne County Sheriff's
Department was the initial officer who had contact with the
Defendant after the Defendant had stopped at the road block.
Deputy Roberts observed the odor of alcohol coming from the
Defendant's breath and based upon that observation directed the
Defendant to pull his vehicle to the side of the roadway for
further investigation.
4. Roberts then asked the Defendant to exit his vehicle and
walk to the front of the vehicle. The Defendant did this as
requested. At the front of the vehicle, the Defendant was
requested to take a field sobriety test which the Defendant
declined to take.
5. After the discussion at the front of the Defendant's
vehicle, the Defendant again walked back to his vehicle and
reentered his car.
6. During Deputy Roberts initial contact with the Defendant,
he requested and received the Defendant's driver's license.
Nothing unusual with respect to the production of the license was
reported.
7. The evidence clearly indicates that the Defendant
understood the request and instructions of Deputy Roberts and
responded appropriately to the same.
8. The Defendant spoke in a normal speech pattern (that is
there was no slurred speech).
9. The Defendant's mental processes were not affected by the
alcohol that he had consumed. Defendant was able to communicate
with the officers in a normal fashion.

10. Deputy Roberts/ who was arguably in the best position to
observe, did not report anything unusual in the ability of the
Defendant to exit his vehicle, walk to the front of his vehicle,
stand while talking to Deputy Roberts at the front of his vehicle,
walked back, and reentered the vehicle.
11. Deputy Roberts did not place the Defendant under arrest
nor testify that he had formed an opinion that the Defendant was
in violation of the law prohibiting Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol. Indeed, at trial, Deputy Roberts indicated that except
for the odor of alcohol, there was no other indication that the
Defendant was intoxicated .
12. Trooper Gustin, of the Utah Highway Patrol, observed the
Defendant at the road block and as the Defendant pulled his
vehicle to the side of the road. Trooper Gustin was some distance
from the Defendant's car when the Defendant exited his car.
13. Trooper Gustin noted that the Defendant was unsteady as
he walked (i.e. he lifted his legs higher than usual in walking
and seemed to place his foot down carefully). Trooper Gustin did
not report any other unusual conduct with respect to the
Defendant's ability to stand or walk.
14. After the Defendant returned to the vehicle, Deputy
Roberts went over to Trooper Gustin and requested Trooper Gustin*s
help in the investigation. Deputy Roberts apparently believed
Trooper Gustin (who has twenty years experience) to be more
qualified to handle the investigation. Deputy Roberts informed
Trooper Gustin that the Defendant had refused to take a field
sobriety test. From that point on, Trooper Gustin dealt with the
Defendant. Deputy Roberts had no further contact prior to the
arrest of the Defendant.
15. After Deputy Roberts left the Defendant, and while the
Defendant was seated in his vehicle, Trooper Gustin had a
converation with the Defendant. During that conversation, Trooper
Gustin observed that the Defendant's hands were shaking.
16. Defendant refused to cooperate with Trooper Gustin in
taking a horizontal eye nystagmus test and was argumentative.
17. Although Defendant was less than cooperative with Trooper
Gustin, the evidence indicates clearly that he was able to
converse with Trooper Gustin in a normal fashion (that is, there
was no indication of impaired speech, inability to understand, or
inability to communicate, etc.).
18. During the interviews with the two officers, the
Defendant indicated to each officer that he had consumed two
beers.
19. Based upon his observations of the Defendant, Trooper
Gustin formed an opinion that the Defendant was in violation of
the law with respect to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and
placed the Defendant under arrest.

20. The specific factual observations that Trooper Gustin
relied upon forming his opinions were:
A.

The odor of alcohol.

B.

The Defendant's statement that he had consumed two

beers.
C. Trooper Gustin1s observation that the Defendant
lifted his legs higher than normal and carefully put them down in
walking to and from the front of the car.
D.

His observations that the Defendant's hands shook.

E. The fact that the Defendant, who is a licensed
attorney, refused to take a field sobriety test. (Trooper Gustin
apparently believed that, because the Defendant was familiar with
the purpose of a field sobriety test, his refusal to take the
tests was an implied admission that he had consumed sufficient
alcohol so that he could not pass the tests.)
F.

Pinkish eyes, erratic mood swings, and beer in the

vehicle.
20. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the Defendant
had a right not to take the field sobriety tests and the exercise
of that right cannot be construed as evidence of intoxication.
21. There was no evidence submitted to the Court which would
indicate that shaking hands are caused by the consumption of
alcohol. Common experience suggests that there are many causes
for shaking of the extremities which have nothing to do with the
consumption of alcohol. Moreover, with respect to alcohol
consumption, shaking is more often associated with non-consumption
(that is the "shakes" often experienced by individuals who are
dependent upon alcohol but who have not consumed the same). Based
upon the evidence in this case, the Court concludes that the fact
that the Defendant's hands shook is not probative of
intoxication. The description of the Defendant's pinkish eyes,
erratic mood swings, and beer in the vehicle as described, are
also not highly suggestive of intoxication.
22. In this type of case, what is not said is often as
convincing to the Court as what is said. In this case, the
Defendant was able to do many tasks which would indicate that he
was not intoxicated within the meaning of the DUI statute. Among
the indications of sobriety are:
A. The fact that he was able to recognize the road block and
respond appropriately to it;
B. The fact that he was able to pull the vehicle to the side
of the road as instructed by the officer;

C. The fact that he was able to produce his driver's license
without difficulty as requested;
D. The fact that he was able to exit his vehicle, walk to
the front of the car, stand and talk with Deputy Roberts, return
and reenter the vehicle without great difficulty.
(The Court does not doubt the observations of Trooper Gustin with
respect to the Defendant's movements. However, in view of the
fact that he was some distance from the event and in view of the
fact that the unusual movement was apparently not noticed by
Deputy Roberts, the Court concludes that the movements of the
Defendant which were noted by Trooper Gustin were not highly
suggestive of intoxication. Neither officer reported any
staggering, any problem with upper body movement while standing,
use of the vehicle for support, or other common actions of those
who have been affected by the consumption of alcohol. Indeed,
Deputy Roberts, who was arguably in the best position to observe,
and who was undoubtedly looking for the effects of alcohol, did
not report anything unusual with respect to the conduct of the
Defendant while outside the vehicle.)
E. The fact that the Defendant's speech pattern was not
affected.
F. The fact that the Defendant was obviously in control of
his thought processes. The Defendant was able to understand and
communicate with the officers.
23. Based upon the testimony of Deputy Roberts, the Court
concludes that he did not observe facts which would support
probable cause to arrest. Indeed, in view of the close contact
that Deputy Roberts had with the Defendant, his testimony could
only support a finding that the Defendant was not intoxicated
within the meaning of the DUI statute.
24. As stated above, the Court is not convinced that the
shaking of hands is indicative of intoxication. Further, as
stated above, the fact that the Defendant refused to take the
field sobriety tests is not evidence of intoxication. With
respect to the remaining testimony of Trooper Gustin this Court is
left with his observation that the Defendant smelled of alcohol,
had blood shot eyes, the Defendant's admission that he consumed
two beers, Trooper Gustin's observations concerning the
Defendant's unusual walking, and his mood swings. As indicated at
Trial, absent the testimony of Deputy Roberts, this Court may have
been inclined to rely upon Trooper Gustin's obvious integrity in
coming to the conclusion that the Defendant was intoxicated. The
affects of alcohol upon the human body are often difficult to
articulate. To some extent, a verbal description can not
accurately describe what the officer has observed. There are many
nuances which bespeak intoxication which cannot be adequately
articulated. This Court would normally give weight to an
officer's opinion that an individual was intoxicated in addition
to the weight given to specific facts that the officer bases his
opinion on. (In other words, the fact that a witness came to the
conclusion that the Defendant is intoxicated has weight in
addition to the specific facts which support an opinion).

After having observed Trooper Gustin and listening to his
testimony, the Court is convinced that he honestly believed that
the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and acted in good
faith in making this arrest. It is significant to note that he
apparently did not have an opportunity to discuss his observations
with Deputy Roberts and was not aware that Deputy Roberts had not
observed anything unusual concerning the Defendant's walking.
Therefore, he gave his observation of the Defendant's walking
weight which, in view of Roberts' testimony, the Court cannot.
In order to support an arrest, the Court must find facts
which would justify a reasonable police officer to believe that a
public offense had been committed in the officer's presence. In
this case we have two officers who apparently came to different
conclusions concerning the Defendant's condition. (Although
Roberts did not affirmatively indicate that the Defendant was not
intoxicated, no other conclusion would be supported by his
testimony). While the observation of Trooper Gustin may have
supported an arrest (if given the full weight of the
observations), after considering the testimony of both officers,
the Court concludes that probable cause for arrest did not exist.
When there is a conflict in to the evidence, the trier of
fact is given the duty to resolve the conflict and in doing so I
conclude that a reasonable officer who observed the Defendant walk
to and from his vehicle would not have found his movement highly
suggestive of intoxication. The fact that Roberts did not observe
the reported unusual steps and the fact that no other movement
suggestive of intoxication (i.e. staggering steps, upper body
movement, difficulty in exiting the vehicle, use of the vehicle as
support) was reported, compel the Court to come to this conclusion.
In ruling on this matter, it is not the intent of the
undersigned that this matter will constitute res judicata in any
other proceeding and to the extent the Court may limit its
findings to this case, the Court's finding shall not consitute res
judicata in any civil proceeding. This is especially true because
the Court believes that the testimony of Roberts was not
complete. In this matter the prosecution did not appear to rely
at all upon Deputy Roberts on the issue of intoxication. It
appeared to the Court that Roberts was called and testified to
establish that the Defendant had operated the motor vehicle. As
indicated above, the Court is compelled to conclude that Roberts
did not believe that the Defendant was intoxicated. However,
because the examination of Roberts was not extensive with respect
to intoxication, the Court believes that res judicata with respect
to the probable cause for arrest ought not to apply.

Based upon the above, the Court finds that probable cause for
the arrest did not exist. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress all
evidence which was gathered subsequent to the arrest is,
therefore, granted. Based upon the evidence which was submitted
to the Court prior to the arrest, the Court finds reasonable doubt
as to the crime charged and finds the Defendant not guilty.
DATED this 14th of August, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNEf CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
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